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Richard Apostle* Lessons from the Abyss:
Knut H. Mikalsen** Reflections on Recent Fisheries
Crises in Atlantic Canada and
North Norway'
This paper examines some of the basic economic, political and scientific
assumptions we have utilized to organize fisheries activities in the North Atlantic.
In particular, we discuss and criticize our commitments to corporate economic
organization, centralized administrative structures, and conventional science. In
addition, we raise questions about the obligation of our respective nation-states
to the coastal communities which have most directly been affected by the social
policies emanating from our institutional commitments.
Introduction
The crises of the late 1980s in the Atlantic Canadian and North Norwegian
groundfisheries have once again provoked interest in the underlying eco-
nomic, political, and social principles on which we have organized our
fisheries. 2 In this essay, we will try to elaborate on some of the basic
assumptions behind the organization and management of our fisheries-
assumptions we believe are now being reevaluated-and indicate some of
the alternatives which are being considered. Is our commitment to corporate
economic organization economically rational or socially desirable? Do our
centralized and hierarchical administrative structures generate good policy,
* Richard Apostle is Professor and Chair of the Department of Sociology and Social
Anthropology at Dalhousie University. He has written extensively on topics in maritime social
science.
** Knut H. Mikalsen is Associate Professor and Chair of the Political Science Department at
Tromso University. He has numerous publications on fisheries management and politics.
1. We want to acknowledge the generous research support the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation has given us over the past three years to participate in a seven-person,
interdisciplinary project on markets and trade, entrepreneurship and communities, and
resource regimes in Atlantic Canada and North Norway. While our work goes back over a
considerably longer period, we have benefited enormously from the project collaboration. Our
co-investigators-Gene Barrett, Petter Holm, Leigh Mazany, Bonnie McCay and Svein Jentoft-
share no public responsibility for the opinions expressed here. We will, however, hold them
personally accountable for every piece of criticism we receive.
2. We have tried to establish the comparability of our two regions, at least for purposes of
looking at resource dependency problems, in an earlier essay. See R. Apostle & K.H. Mikalsen,
"The Politics of Fishery Management: Preliminary Comparisons of Regulatory Regimes in
North Norway and Nova Scotia" (1993) 6 Scandanavian-Canadian Studies 47. As marginal
North Atlantic areas in countries which are themselves minor components of two of the world's
major trading blocs, there are an impressive number of commonalities, and some crucial
differences, which make them excellent candidates for comparative work.
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equitable allocation processes, and fair enforcement? Can we create a better
set of connections between different types of resource-based communities,
fluctuating stocks and international markets for fish products?
Whatever the attitudes and policies of particular governments, the
larger society bears an obligation to help coastal communities. This
obligation is directly related to thirty years of tolerance of both national
and international over-exploitation of fish stocks, with little thought to
the longterm ecological or social consequences. 3 We think our experi-
ence with, and knowledge of, basic and applied debates which have led
to the current state of affairs in both countries, may help illuminate some
of the choices we will have to confront over the next decade.
We will present our comments in separate sections on industrial
organization, class structures, political institutions, and cultures. Al-
though there are obvious interconnections among these domains, we will
initially try to address major issues in each area, and attempt to evaluate
complementary and contradictory associations in a concluding section.
We will begin with a brief account of the major crises which have recently
confronted our two fisheries systems, and the differing outcomes we have
so far encountered.
3. The obligation to assist coastal communities also pertains to the question of aboriginal
rights in the fisheries. This question may not be as important in Atlantic Canada as in British
Columbia and North Norway. Nevertheless, some interesting changes and debates are
occurring. In a recent case R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 4 W.W.R. 410, the Supreme
Court of Canada ruled that aboriginal rights to fish for food, social and ceremonial purposes
have constitutional protection where they exist. These rights give aboriginals first priority to
fish in areas of traditional activity, save for demonstrable conservation requirements. There has
been considerable debate about the ramifications of this ruling for broader aboriginal rights.
Some commentators think that the case may weaken aboriginal claims for commercial
fisheries. (W.I.C. Binnie, "The Sparrow Doctrine: Beginning of the End or End of the
Beginning?" (1990) 15 Queen's L.J. 217) Others are concerned that "the Court has expanded
its own discretionary power, and propelled itself toward a new and questionable role as a
constitutional department of fisheries". (D.W. Elliott, "In the Wake of Sparrow: A New
Department of Fisheries" (1991) 40 U.N.B.L.J. 23 at 42) Whatever the outcome of the general
debate, it is already clear that the issue of aboriginal rights is beginning to have practical
ramifications. Four Yarmouth-area men were recently charged with break and enter and assault
in connection with a dispute over aboriginal rights in the lobster fishery. To quote Rob Gorham,
"Since late August three boats used by Micmac fishermen have been burned, a fourth boat was
smashed, and fishing gear has been stolen. Some local fishermen are upset with non-natives,
who they say are helping natives bend the rules relating to fishing under treaty rights" (The
[Halifax] Chronicle Herald 20 October 1992 at 1)
In Norway, this issue concerns the fishing rights of the Saami, and the Saami Parliament
has been particularly active pursuing this issue-with reference to international legislation
(ratified by Norway) aimed at protecting the interests of aboriginal peoples. Legal experts have
concluded that a more direct participation by Saami user groups in management decision-
making is in order, and that discrimination beneficial to Saami fishers and their communities
is legally defensible if necessary to sustain Saami culture. In 1992 the Saami Parliament was
authorized to appoint a delegate to the National Regulatory Council.
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I. Fisheries Crises
It is a commonplace observation that commercial fisheries are subject to
periodic crises typically associated with fluctuations in resource avail-
ability or market conditions. The causes of these fluctuations are various.
Resource changes are frequently attributed to overfishing, environmental
conditions, "natural" stock fluctuations, or some combination of these
factors. Market circumstances may vary due to competing supplies or
trade relations. Competing supplies may include the same species from
other sources, regions, or countries; economic factors include trade
barriers and exchange rates.
Since the 1977 declaration of 200-mile exclusive economic zones by
the industrial world's major fishing nations, Atlantic Canada has experi-
enced two significant fishing "crises", while North Norway has had one.
In the early 1980s, the Atlantic Canadian fishing industry went through
an economic downturn which focused on the financial difficulties of
large-scale, vertically-integrated companies in Newfoundland and Nova
Scotia. These companies, which typically combined substantial offshore
harvesting capacity with relatively large on-shore processing plants,
could not sustain the expansion they created to take advantage of the
apparent opportunities created by the exclusion zones. As a consequence,
the federal government and central financial institutions participated in
a financial restructuring of the companies which met with some disap-
proval in the industry and general public.
4
A second set of resource-driven crises affected Atlantic Canada and
North Norway in the late 1980s.1 In both instances, a rapid and unantici-
pated decline in cod stocks created widespread hardship in the two
regions.6 To this point, however, there is considerable difference in the
resolution of the two crises. The Barents Sea stocks have rebounded
4. M. Kirby, "Restructuring the Atlantic Fishery: A Case Study in Business-Government
Relations" (Paper presented at Dalhousie Law School, 1 March 1984); Canada, Navigating
Troubled Waters. A New Policy for the Atlantic Fisheries (Ottawa: supply and Services
Canada, 1983) (Chair: M.J.L. Kirby) [hereinafter Kirby Report]; E. Weeks & L. Mazany, The
Future of the Atlantic Fishery (Montreal: The Institute for Research in Public Policy, 1983).
5. Canada, Report on Scotia-Fundy Groundfish Management from 1977 to 1993 by J.R.
Angel et al. (Dartmouth: Bedford Institute of Oceanography, 1994); Canada, Independent
Review of the Northern Cod Stocks by L. Harris (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Service,
1990); S. Jentoft, Dangling Lines, The Fisheries Crisis and the Future of Coastal Communi-
ties: The Norwegian Experience (St. John's: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1993);
B. Sagdahl. '"'Ressursforvaltning og Legitimitetsproblemer" (Rapport No. 15/92-20, Nordland
Research Institute, Bodo, 1992).
6. 0. Otterstad & S. Jentoft, eds., Leve Kysten? Strandhogg i FiskeriNorge (Oslo: Ad Notam]
Gyldendal, 1994).
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sufficiently to permit resumption of a substantial fishery,7 whereas
Newfoundland and much of the Maritimes, save Southwest Nova Scotia,
remain inactive under groundfish moratoria which began in the summer
of 1992. While there is still substantial caution about future prospects in
North Norway8, there is deepening pessimism about the likelihood of a
short-run recovery for Atlantic Canadian cod, as well as other groundfish
species.
II. Industrial Organization
There has been a relatively strong preference throughout the twentieth
century to utilize large-scale corporate organization to reap the (assumed)
benefits of scale in European as well as North American economies. This
preference has even been extended to areas of the economy to which the
form is ill-suited, and the subsequent lack of fit usually results in
devolution towards dual, split or segmented capital and labour markets in
which marginal sectors, at one level, accommodate unstable demand.9
The fishing industry has proven to be one area in which larger business
organizations either have not fared well, as in Atlantic Canada, or have
never taken root, as in North Norway. Fluctuations in the availability of
resources, and the lack of control over international markets, make
planning in the industry difficult. These variations pose a particular threat
to large-scale organizations which depend on a regular flow of raw
material to supply institutional buyers or food chains, be they located in
the United States or on the European continent.
In Atlantic Canada, the record of large-scale domestic harvesters and
processors, although not definitively resolved, has not been impressive.
We had to provide a substantial infusion of financial assistance to bridge
the period of overexpansion in the early 1980s. Further, large domestic
companies have found it difficult to make a consistent profit from their
activities, even before the 1992 moratorium on northern cod.10 By
contrast, some of the small- and intermediate-scale operations have
7. The improvement in the Barents Sea cod stock is reflected in the increase of the TAC-from
113,000 tonnes in 1991 to 248, 000 tonnes in 1993 and 336,000 tontles for 1994.
8. G. Barrett & S. Jentoft, "The Global Fishing Village. Finnmark: A Canadian Fisheries
Scenario" (Paper presented at the 1994 American Fisheries Society Annual Meetings, August
1994).
9. R. Apostle, D. Clairmont & L. Osberg, "Segmentation and Labour Force Strategies"
(1985). 10 Can. J. of Socio. 253.
10. Kirby Report, supra note 4; K. Barrett, "Financial Characteristics, 1974-1984" in R.
Apostle & G. Barrett, eds., Emptying Their Nets. Small Capital and Rural Industrialization in
the Nova Scotia Fishing Industry (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) [hereinafter
Emptying Their Nets].
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proven to be quite economically resilient over the same period", although
the current stock crisis is obviously affecting them as well. The continu-
ing difficulty that commitment to large-scale organizational forms poses
is the question of adaptability. If and when the groundfish return, the
investments which have already been made in vessels and plants create
substantial pressure to resume business as before. We have constructed
production systems which have relatively large numbers of jobs attached
to them. Some of the larger rural communities have depended on this
activity for their wellbeing, and they will exert considerable political
influence to continue business as usual. Whether this is economically
justifiable may not be a question which will reach the public agenda. 2
The concept of the large scale corporate organization never really took
hold in Norwegian fisheries. 3 The fish processing industry has always
been dominated by small and medium-sized firms. In fact, three out of
four have fewer than fifty employees" 4-and there is very little vertical
integration 5. In the Norwegian case, the structure of the industry reflects
the fact that harvesting is done from small vessels out of small commu-
nities scattered along the coast. By contrast, Atlantic Canada combines
larger, corporate-dominated towns with a substantial number of smaller
plants and communities.
11. Emptying Their Nets, ibid.
12. In the early 1980s, at the time of the financial restructuring of the Atlantic Canadian
industry, Ernest Cadegan, then President of the Independent Seafood Producers of Nova
Scotia, made a strong plea to let the large organizations go bankrupt, leaving the industry free
to pick up the viable components of these organizations. See E. Cadegan, "The Role of the
Private Sector in the Atlantic Fishery" (Speech presented at the Conference on the Future
Fishery of Canada, White Point, Nova Scotia, 27 March 1984).
13. This is not to say that Norwegian fisheries lack vertically integrated firms and activities.
The government sponsored the introduction of trawlers after World War II, and most of these
were integrated with processing plants-such as the FI-NO-TRO (Finnmark and Nord-Troms
processing industry) and Findus. See B. Lien, Findus og Norsk Fiskerpolitikk 1943-1956 (MA
Thesis, University of Tromso, 1975); B. Hersoug & D. Leonardsen, Bygger de Landet? (Oslo:
Pax, 1979); Hersoug and Leonardsen, 1979. The latter is the largest in Norway-located in the
county of Finnmark. It has its own fleet of trawlers and employs about 350 people-and is a
part of the Nestl6 corporation.
14. R. Apostle & S. Jentoft, "Nova Scotia and North Norway Fisheries: The Future of Small-
Scale Processors" (1991) 15 Marine Policy 100; S. Jentoft, supra note 5.
15. There are, in fact, legal barriers against vertical integration in Norwegian fisheries.
According to the so-called "Ownership Act" of 1956 (later incorporated into the Limited Entry
Act of 1972), one has to be an active fisherman to own a vessel. There are, of course, exceptions
to that rule, but such legislation has certainly been instrumental in preventing processors from
acquiring control overharvesting. See K.H. Mikalsen, "Fiskeripolitikk som Ressursforvaltning"
in K.H. Mikalsen & B. Sagdahl, eds., Fiskerpolitikk og Forvaltningsorganisasjon (Tromso:
Universitetsforlaget, 1992) 287. Another barrier, now lifted, was the Export Act that gave
certain organizations a virtual monopoly over the marketing and sales of dried and salt fish in
particular. See A. Hallenstevdt, Med Lov og Organisasjon (Troms0: Universitetsforlaget,
1982).
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The general trend in Norwegian fisheries during the 1980s was one of
decline. Catches were down (by almost 20 per cent), as was the number
of fishers (from 35,000 to 27,000) and the number of vessels (from 26,000
to 18,000) (St.meld. nr. 58, 1991-92). The number of plants declined
from 857 in 1975 to 517 in 1990; the number of employees from 15,000
in 1980 to 10,500 ten years later.' 6 In North Norway, the decline was
particularly sharp in the latter half of the 1980s, as the number of
employees in processing was down by almost 50 per cent between 1984
and 1990. The northernmost, and most fisheries dependent county of
Finnmark, was hit the hardest. Here the number of frozen fish producers
(plants) has declined sharply since 1985, as has the number of employ-
ees.' 7 The main explanation: lack of fish due to severe quota restrictions.
Recent trends, however, are more encouraging. The stocks have bounced
back sooner than expected, quotas are larger, and there has been an
increase in Russian landwigs due, in part, to a lifting oT imp rt restrictions
through an amendment of the so-called Sea-Border Act. More than half
the catches landed in Finnmark in 1992 came from Russian trawlers, and
it is generally agreed that these landings helped parts of the North
Norwegian industry survive. The problem, of course, is the uncertainty
of future Russian landings.
The industry has changed as a consequence of the crisis. Although a
substantial number of small-scale operators have gone out of business,
there are signs of an economic revival along the North Norwegian coast.
The overall impression is one of a leaner but fitter industry. The crucial
question, of course, is whether this will last-and to what extent the
industry has learnt any lessons and will be better prepared should a crisis
hit again.
III. Class Structure
The relevant class structures and associated interest groupings, political
parties, and occasional social movements vary substantially across At-
lantic Canada, as well as within the country as a whole. 8 In Atlantic
16. 03. Oklysadi, "Norsk Fik ym-iagt 194S til 1991. £ F t~f~zbk P1 vaksut-
Syklus" in 0. Otterstad & S. Jentoft, eds., supra note 6, 15.
17. M. Adnanes, "Fiskeindustrien--Omstilling i SorOg Krise i Nord?", in 0. Otterstad & S.
Jentoft, eds., ibid., 169.
18. Emptying Their Nets, supra note 10; W. Clement, The Struggle to Organize: Resistance
in Canada's Fishery (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986); J.D. House, "The Mouse That
Roars: New Directions in Canadian Political Economy" in R. Brym, ed., Regionalism in
Canada (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1986); P. Marchak, N. Guppy & J. McMullan, Uncommon
Property: The Fishing and Fish Processing Industry in British Columbia (Toronto:
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Canada, the major contrast is that between Newfoundland and Nova
Scotia. In Newfoundland, there is a reasonably clearcut bifurcation which
divides direct or petty producers from the corporate sector. By contrast,
Nova Scotia has a heterogeneous class structure, with significant internal
divisions between direct and petty producers. In part, this interprovincial
difference is connected to the fact that shellfish, particularly lobster and
scallops, provide significant supplementary or alternative sources of
income in Nova Scotia. It is also associated with a greater variety of
conflicting gear types, and with closer proximity to New England
markets which in turn lessens dependence on centralized marketing. 9
In terms of class cultures, most of the Newfoundland fishery has a
more conventional working class perspective, whereas free enterprise
ideology is more prevalent in Nova Scotia. Correspondingly, much of the
Newfoundland industry receives representation through a trade union,
whereas the Nova Scotia industry tends to prefer associational represen-
tation or, more radically, no organized representation at all. The multi-
plicity of voices which has typified the Nova Scotia industry has both
lessened their actual influence in a number of important domains, and has
inadvertently strengthened the position of corporate interests.2°
In Norwegian fisheries, there is a basic distinction to be made between
inshore and offshore; between the owners and operators of large trawlers
(most of which are vertically integrated), purse seiners and factory ships
on the one hand and the large group of fishers operating smaller vessels
and somewhat simpler technology in the fjords and along the coast. This
dual structure, however, reflects differences in technology and gear types
rather than deep-rooted cleavages between distinct social classes.2 1
Technological diversification has been decisive both in creating con-
flicts and in generating collective action. Although Norwegian fishers
Methuen, 1987); P. Sinclair, "The State Goes Fishing: The Emergence of Public Ownership
in the Newfoundland Fishing Industry" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Atlantic
Association of Sociologists and Anthropologists, University of New Brunswick, March 1984).
19. Both neoclassically-oriented economists and radical political economists try to downplay
the significance of this difference by locating the Nova Scotia complexities in "Southwest"
Nova Scotia, and then dismiss that comer of the province as a minor exception to regional
trends. The obvious problem with this blinkered perception is the fact that "Southwest" Nova
Scotia accounts, by various measures, for 80 percent or more of the province's fishery.
20. This statement is not meant to overlook the support provincial and federal governments
have given to non-union alternatives. Nevertheless, there are different opinions within
government, some of which argue that any form of organization, including unions, is preferable
to the plethora of small groupings which undermine "rational management" of the fisheries.
21. This division has both regional and community-level components. The offshore is
disproportionately located in large population centers in western and southern areas of
Norway.
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were comparatively late in organizing 2 , and have kept a diversified
pattern of fairly independent associations, they were quick to learn the art
and craft of collective action. Unlike their Atlantic-Canadian counter-
parts, Norwegian fishers have long been represented by a nationwide
organization, the Fishers Association. In spite of being a somewhat loose
federation of regional and functional groups-prone to internal conflict
and dissent-this organization has provided efficient representation for
most groups of fishers. 23 The drive towards organization and coordina-
tion, supported by government through legislation 24, reflects a political
culture that is collectivist and group-oriented-with a clear understand-
ing of organization as a basic precondition for the efficient representation
of group interests. 25 Collectivist attitudes have also found expression in




The political institutions which frame the Atlantic Canadian fishery are,
in the international context, quite hierarchically organized, with the
federal Minister of Fisheries and Oceans having powers which are not
exceeded in other democratic industrial regimes, or within the Canadian
federal system. Since the federal government controls a substantial
majority of fishing industry's activities 27, it should come as little surprise
that fisher involvement in the system is limited by a complex "consulta-
tive management" scheme in which the Department of Fisheries and
Oceans (DFO) genevally retains control over the nature and extent of
input that industry can make. In the Scotia-Fundy region of DFO, which
22. A. Hallenstvedt, supra note 15.
23. B. Sagdahl, "Struktur, Organisasjon og Innflytelsesforhold i Norsk Fiskeripolitikk", in
K.H. Mikalsen & B. Sagdall, eds., supra note 15, 15; S. Jentoft & K.H. Mikalsen, "Regulating
Fjord Fisheries: Folk Management or Interest Group Politics?" in C.L. Dyer& J.R. McGoodwin,
eds., Folk Management in the World Fisheries: Lessons for Modern Fisheries Management
(Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1987) 287.
24. A. Hallenstvedt, supra note 15; P. P. Christensen & Hallenstvedt, Pd Forste Hdnd
(Tromso: Norges Rafisklag, 1990).
25. A. Halesed,, & B. Byvmia, Fra Skdrange Tit Hovedsmanit: med Norges Fiskerlag
Gjennom 50 Ar (Trondhein: Norges Fiskerlag, 1976); B. Sagdahl, in K.H. Mikalsen & B.
Sagdahl, eds., supra note 15.
26. S. Rokkan, "Geography, Religion and Social Class: Crosscutting Cleavages in Norwe-
gian Politics" in S.M. Lipsct & S. Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross-
National Perspectives (New York: The Free Press, 1967) 367; H. Valen, Valg og Politikk----et
Samfunn i Endring (Oslo: NKS-Forlaget, 1981).
27. L.S. Parsons, Management of Marine Fisheries in Canada (Ottawa: National Research
Council of Canada. 1993).
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includes most of Nova Scotia (save the North Shore), as well as South-
west New Brunswick, there are over 30 consultative groups with over 500
members which meet almost a hundred times a year.
In Norway, fisheries decision-making is also centralized, but ministe-
rial discretion is more confined than in Canada. This is, in particular, due
to the organizational capabilities and coherence of fishers, and the long-
standing tradition of consulting representatives of industry, through
formal arrangements at the national level, before decisions are made.28 In
this sense, policies are made through a process of bargaining and
centralized consultations-making the notions of powersharing and
"partnership" more appropriate than the idea of ministerial discretion and
hierarchical control.
The growth of government intervention from the 1970s onwards raises
questions about the levels and types of user-group involvement in
fisheries management, as well as questions about the information avail-
able for policy formulation. In the Scotia-Fundy context, the manage-
ment system has vacillated between genuine consultation on the one hand
and cooptation 29 on the other. In Norwegian fisheries, the management
process is anchored to formal structures-providing a stable institutional
framework for the articulation of user-group demands-sometimes at the
expense of public governance and long-term planning.
3
However, the current crisis has provoked some sharp debate, on both
sides of the Atlantic, about the need to look more closely at the benefits
of consultative practices and co-management arrangements .31 In particu-
lar, it has been maintained that the quality of the information which
underlies current policy-making is seriously flawed and would benefit
from more inputs from "below". In Atlantic Canada, there is no lack of
input as such, but there is clearly a problem of representation in the sense
that those who speak do not necessarily do so on behalf of wider groups.
The lack of clear-cut rules and procedures for the selection of members
28. R. Hannesson, "Inefficiency Through Government Regulations: The Case of Norway's
Fishery Policy" (1990) 2 Marine Resource Economics 115; A.H. Hoel, S. Jentoft & K.H.
Mikalsen, "Problems of User-Group Participation in Norwegian Fisheries Management",
Occasional Papers No. A 56 (Tromso: Institute of Social Science, 1991).
29. D. Maclnnes & A. Davis, "Representational Management or Management of Represen-
tation? The Place of Fishers in Atlantic Canadian Fisheries Management" (1990) Antigonish.
St. Francis Xavier University.
30. K.H. Mikalsen, "Lovgivning, Eiendomsrett og Naeringspolitikk" in K.H. Mikalsen & B.
Sagdahl, eds., supra note 15, 174; B. Hersoug, "Fiskerplanlegging-Offentlig Styring Eller
Politisk Pliktovelse?" in B. Hersoug, ed., Kan Fiskerinaeringen Styres? (Oslo: Novus, 1983).
31. E. Pinkerton, ed., Co-operative Management of Local Fisheries. New Directions for
Improved Management and Community Development (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 1992).
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to consultative committees makes the consultative stage open to the
extent that it is not always clear whether those turning up at meetings
represent anyone but themselves.
In Norway, the main problem is rather how to balance group influence
and demands against ministerial direction and the public interest. Corpo-
ratist arrangements clearly entail privileged access, or even a representa-
tional monopoly, for "affected groups", and tend to exclude others that
could claim a stake in fisheries management 2. Moreover, there is the
emphasis on logrolling and compromise within corporatist systems, and
the understanding that a commendable policy, almost by definition, is one
to which those involved can agree--or the one that is favoured by a
winning coalition. In this sense, consensus and legitimacy rather than
efficiency and governance are core values of the Norwegian management
system.
However, the information problem is not just about consultation and
representation. It also pertains, and increasingly so, to the role of
contemporary fisheries science.33 The basic challenge is twofold. On the
one hand, fishers in both countries are increasingly dissatisfied that their
local knowledge of specific conditions is not being systematically incor-
porated in scientific projections. Fishers think that they have important
information which would modify or alter the management measures that
basically follow from government surveys that employ scientific sam-
pling techniques to cover large areas, as well as aggregated commercial
catch data. In response, some DFO scientists have begun to create
working groups which bring fishers and scientists together to talk about
their different perspectives. Norwegian scientists have long attended the
annual meetings and conferences of fishers' associations-lecturing as
well as listening. Nevertheless, these experiments are limited, and there
is a sense among fishers that, when in conflict, it is local perceptions
which will be ignored.34
32. Examples of such groups could be consumers, with a legitimate interest in the quality and
availability of fish products, which may be affected by regulatory practices; regional and local
authorities, since management decisions may affect employment opportunities and the welfare
of local communities; environmental groups for the preservation of stocks and the balance of
vulnerable ecosystems; and aboriginal groups concerned about the effects of management
practices on historical rights and traditional ways of life.
33. A.C. Finlayson, Fishing For Truth: A Sociological Analysis of Northern Cod Stock
Assessments (St. John's: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1994); N. Gilbertson,
"Chaos on the Commons: Salmon and Such" (1993) 6 Maritime Anthropological Studies 74;
E. Smith, "Chaos in Fisheries Management" (1990) 3 Maritime Anthropological Studies 1; J.
Wilson & P. Kleban, "Practical Implications of Chaos in Fisheries: Ecologically Adapted
Management" (1990) 5 Marine Anthropological Studies 67.
34. S. Jentoft & K.H. Mikalsen, supra note 23.
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The other basic challenge comes from within the scientific community
itself. In Atlantic Canada, the recent crises have led members of the
academy, as well as fisheries scientists, to re-examine the adequacy of the
fundamental scientific assumptions on which their methodologies are
founded. In particular, the complex dynamics of individual species, and
the interrelatedness of different species, has created a surge of interest in
new "chaos" theories which are designed to explain the behaviour of
systems which are aperiodic, nonlinear, and sensitive to small distur-
bances.35 If it is true that chaos theory provides a more efficient method
for modelling the behaviour of fish stocks, and this remains to be
demonstrated3 6, much of the current scientific apparatus which is used to
generate stock estimates for current allocation decisions may be dispens-
able. At one level, chaos theory leads in the direction of establishing
simple, longterm estimates of acceptable harvest levels which means that
one can dispense with the continuous need, under current systems, to
collect information on yearly variations in individual stock levels.37 The
prospect that major scientific establishments are at risk has not gone
unnoticed, and the debates at scientific meetings are beginning to reflect
some of the potentially important practical implications of these
controversies.
On the Norwegian side, this kind of soul-searching within the scien-
tific community is more limited. The immediate crisis is over, and part of
the blame can be attributed to foreign activities. There is, however, an
increasing willingness among scientists to question the quality of biologi-
cal data and the accuracy of stock assessments. There is also a little less
disdain for inputs from fishers and for possible contributions from
fisheries economists. Chaos theory has, as yet, made few imprints on
debates about the role of science in fisheries management.
35. It should be understood that we are still talking about deterministic systems in that chance
is not an intrinsic element in the system, and it takes relatively few equations to describe the
system. See S. Kellert,In the Wake of Chaos (Chicago: The University of ChicagoPress, 1993).
Further, the range of useful applications for chaos theory is still being explored among natural
scientists. See also J. Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Viking Press, 1987).
As a consequence, much of the current attack on positivism in the social sciences which is being
conducted under the banner of chaos theory meets with amused derision among natural
scientists.
36. J. Wilson et at., "Managing Unpredictable Resources: Traditional Policies Applied to
Chaotic Populations" (1990) 13 Ocean and Shoreline Management 179.
37. For one effort to establish a longterm harvesting goal for northern cod, see D.H. Steele,
R. Andersen & J.M. Green, "The Managed Commercial Annihilation of Northern Cod" (1992)
8 Newfoundland Studies 34. Although not guided by chaos theory, this work recognized that
overall biomass is a relatively stable feature of most fisheries systems.
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V. Cultures
The first, and most important, observation to make about cultures in our
regions is that the small rural communities which are the locus of fishing
activity are increasingly incorporated in urban and national cultural
systems, as well as international ones. The notion that we are dealing with
people whose work and lifestyles are at marked variance with the larger
society is a less justifiable one. In many ways, individuals and households
in fishing communities look much like those located in other parts of
Canada and Norway38, and share the same material desires and family
goals. Further, there is increasing evidence of the impact of international
cultures in rural fishing communities. In both Nova Scotia and North
Norway, everything from the trivial example of the string of satellite
dishes on Digby Neck and in Bdtsfjord, to the more significant accumu-
lation of knowledge about international industrial and marketing trends,
provide testimony to the importance of international considerations in the
daily life of fishing communities on both sides of the Atlantic.
Still, in Atlantic Canada, there are irreducible differences in the
capacity of our health, education and welfare systems to deliver services
to more rural areas, and people located there are disadvantaged in some
respects. And, unfortunately, the economic recession has had the effect
of worsening some of the discrepancies. Nevertheless, many people
currently living in smaller, more rural communities are prepared to trade
off institutional benefits for the social and cultural richness which is
moderately associated with local kin and other networks.39 It is also
important to note that many people in these rural areas are home owners
and, with modest educational backgrounds, have noreasonable prospects
of acquiring similar accommodation if they move.
In Norway, political commitment to the welfare state remains strong,
and has led to a high level of standardization across regions and commu-
nities. Access to health services, education and other welfare goods does
vary, but variation has decreased over time4°, and rural communities are
not disadvantaged in any systematic way. Growing up--or growing
old-in rural areas may even, in some cases, be a privilege, given the
availability of basic services and the richness of social networks. That
said, it deserves to be noted that outmigration has been a long-standing
38. Emptying Their Nets, supra note 10; 0. Brox, Nord-Norge: Fro Almenning til Koloni
(Tromso: Universitetsforlaget, 1984); I.L. Host & C. Wadel, eds., Fiske og Lokalsamfunn
(Tromso: Universitetsforlaget, 1980).
39. L. Felt & P. Sinclair, "Home Sweet Home! Dimensions of Determinants of Life
Satisfaction in an Underdeveloped Region" (1991) 16 Can. J. Socio. 1.
40. G. Hemes & K. Knutsen, "Utdanning og Ulikhet" (1976) NOU 46; S. Kuhnle & L.
Solheim, Velferdsstaten---Vekst og Omstilling (Oslo: Tano, 1991).
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problem in fishery-dependent communities. People have tended to move
out in search of employment and higher education, and one would expect
the recent fisheries crisis to have strengthened this trend. This, however,
has not been the case, as outmigration in fact decreased after the crisis
struck. The explanation, according to Jentoft4l, is probably the fact that
the general level of unemployment was high-and the prospects of
getting a job by moving bleak.
Another general set of issues which is drawing deserved attention
concerns the contributions women make to fishing economies and
community survival. Academic work, until recently, has tended to
neglect the indispensable roles women occupy in a wide variety of
activities necessary for continuance of Atlantic Canadian as well as North
Norwegian fishing communities. 42 Not only do women contribute irre-
placeable paid labour to processing operations43 , they also, in some cases,
hold executive positions in processing firms", and they frequently
constitute the financial and organizational components of many harvest-
ing operations.4 5 Further, depending on the types of harvesting prevalent
in the community, they may also staff and lead community institutions.
46
And, as always, women do a disproportionately high share of the work in
the household itself.
47
41. S. Jentoft, "Hvordan Forlep Fiskerkrisen?", in 0. Otterstad & S. Jentoft, eds., supra
note 6, 45.
42. E. Antler, "Women's Work on Newfoundland Fishing Families' (1977) 2 Atlantis 106;
P. Barber, "Household and Workplace in 'Northfield"', in Emptying Their Nets, supra note 10,
272; S.S. Larsen, "Omsorgsbonden" (1980) 21 Tidssfrift for Samfunnsforskning 283; M.
Binkley & V. Thiessen, "Ten Days a Grass Widow-Forth-Eight Hours a Wife": Sexual
Division of Labour in Trawlermen's Households" (1988) 8 Culture 39; P. Connelly & M.
MacDonald, "Women's Work: Domestic and Wage Labour in a Nova Scotia Community"
(1983) 10 Studies Pol. Economy 45; M. Porter, "Peripheral Women: Towards a Feminist
Analysis of the Atlantic Region" (1987) 23 Studies Pol. Economy 41; S. Jentoft, V. Thiessen
& A. Davis, "The Veiled Crew: An Exploratory Study of Wives" (1992) 54 Human
Organization 342.
43. M. Lie, ""Kvinner pA Filetfabrikk 1943-56" in I.L. Host & C. Wadel, eds., supra note 31
at 165; S. Ilcan, "Women and Casual Work in the Nova Scotian Fish Processing Industry"
(1986) 11 Atlantis 23; M. Giasson, "Capital and Work-Force Adaptation in Clare" in Emptying
Their Nets, supra note 5, 232; S. Gerrard, "Kvinner i Fiskeridistrikter: Fishkerineringa
"Bakkemannskap'"" in B. Hersoug, ed., Kan FishkerinceingaStyres? (Oslo: Norvus, 1983) 217.
44. M. Husmo, "Kvinnelige Fiskeindustriledere", in 0. Otterstad & S. Jentoft, eds., supra
note 6, 191.
45. S. Gerrard, "Kvinners Forvaltning-Havets Husholdning" in 0. Otterstad & S. Jentoft,
eds., ibid., 123; L.T. Pettersen, "Hovedsaken er at Kjerringa er i Arbeid", in 0. Otterstad & S.
Jentoft, eds., ibid., 65.
46. L. Holtedahl, Hva Mutter Gjor er Alhrid Viktig (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1986).
47. Emptying Their Nets, supra note 10.
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The difficulties with our understandings of community, gender and
culture are twofold. The first problem exists in both Canadian and
Norwegian social science, and concerns the necessarily qualitative nature
of much of this kind of analysis. Studies of culture, community, house-
hold and gender must frequently be done in a non-quantitative way
because of the complexity of the issues being examined. As a conse-
quence, these studies are at an immediate disadvantage in policy debates
which privilege natural science discourses in biology and economics.
The second problem relates to the fact that much of the excellent work
that has been done on the resilience and creativity of small fishing
communities is defensive in tone. These accounts do not address the
significant question of what it means to try to locate fishing activities in
larger, more impersonal and more stratified towns. More importantly,
they also do not directly challenge the economic assumptions about the
desirability of more centralized production. These difficulties are more
apparent in Canadian studies because Norwegian studies of regional
development and local communities do question conventional assump-
tions, criticize public policies, and discuss alternative scenarios.
48
VI. Discussion
What, if any, are the lessons to be drawn from the events of the recent
past? We think there may be several. At the level of industrial strategies
and organization, there will have to be more creative thought on the
question of how to fit available resources with appropriate technologies,
community structures, and markets. While there is some public sentiment
favouring smaller-scale harvesting technologies in both countries, there
are no "good guys" or easy answers. Recent, systematic overfishing by
the inshore fixed-gear fleet in Nova Scotia, and similar tendencies in
North Norway, make it clear that everyone is capable of overexploiting
the stocks.4 9 The technological sophistication and efficiency of the
inshore fleet have certainly improved, and the prime argument that can be
made in favour of fixed gear (gillnet, longline, handline) is that they are
more selective and less "destructive" of small fish than dragger technolo-
gies. Furthermore, smaller-scale harvesting is probably more adaptive to
48. 0. Bronx, Hva Skjer iNord-Norge (Oslo: Pax, 1966); 0. Bronx, supra note 38; R. Nilsen,
"Konsolidering og Lokale Okonmiske Prosessar i ein Oykommune" (1980) 21 Tidsskrift for
Samfunnsforskning 255; R. Nilsen, GjenstridigeFjordfolk:Arbeidsliv, EtnisitetogRekruttering
i to Nord-Norske Fjordonrdder (Tromso: Forut, 1990).
49. However, one must be careful to avoid blaming victims. Some of the pressures for
overfishing current stocks by the fixed gear fleets are certainly related to prior overfishing by
offshore dragger fleets.
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persisting stock fluctuations. However, the problems sometimes created
by seasonal plant operations will have to be modified by harvesting plans
and strategies which can ensure more consistent delivery of raw materials.
Finally, more attention has to be paid to market prospects in both
regions. In Norwegian fisheries, the prevalence of indirect marketing (i.e.
through cooperative sales organizations and independent exporters) has
excluded processors from acquiring first-hand knowledge of market
developments. In addition, processors were, until recently, prevented
from exporting their own products, as this was a specialized and protected
trade.50 Recent amendments of relevant legislation, however, has made it
possible for processors to establish their own export business, and some
have been quick to take advantage of this. 5' The full impact of this new
legislation remains to be seen, but there is certainly a growing awareness
among processors of the benefits of more direct links with markets and
customers.
A longstanding flaw in Atlantic Canadian fisheries is the assumption
that one can sell what one can catch. This logic frequently tied the industry
to the low end of fish markets, because not enough attention was paid to
market cycles, and to strategies aimed at maximizing returns from higher-
quality products. Equally important, the current crisis has led to the loss
of a number of markets which may be difficult to recapture. It is, for
instance, a commonplace observation at fishery advisory meetings these
days that if the cod returned tomorrow, one would not have anywhere to
sell it.
At the level of class and politics, we need to reexamine the nature and
type of representation that fishers and other folk have in management
practices. As liberal polities based on representative, rather than direct,
participatory democracy, both Norway and Canada have been prone to
regular debates on the scope and quality of interest representation. In
Atlantic Canadian fisheries, the question of who's representing whom is
a recurrent one, as is the problem of how to structure advisory processes
to secure genuine representation for all relevant groups. At the lower
levels of the administrative process this can, and frequently does, lead to
misunderstandings and recriminations, with one perverse outcome in the
Nova Scotia area involving industry demands that DFO pick the repre-
sentatives because the fishers distrust one another.
Just representation is largely a question of organization; of being able
to identify and coordinate common interests and act upon them. In this,
Norwegian fishers have certainly been more successful than their Atlantic
50. A. Hallenstvedt, supra note 15.
51. G. Barrett & S. Jentoft, supra note 8.
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Canadian counterparts. This is not to say that current institutions are
perfect, but rather that they have been able to incorporate a cross-section
of industrial interests and opinions. There is, of course, always the
question of whose interests are being served or accommodated by current
arrangements. The fact that the industry as such, through the participation
of the Fishers's Association on government boards and committees, is
well represented does not necessarily imply that all groups are given a fair
hearing.52 Besides, there is the emerging question of whether, and how,
to incorporate non-industrial groups as full fledged members of the
fisheries policy community-particularly in areas pertaining to resource
conservation and management.
While there are no easy solutions to these perennial debates about the
nature and scope of representation, one principle which might usefully
guide selection processes would be a clear specification of the activities
and powers of different administrative and advisory levels, and a corre-
sponding definition of "interested parties". In the Norwegian context, the
criteria for participation need to be more sharply defined, and the role of
regional and local agencies reconsidered. Recent challenges and de-
mands from public interest groups (and northern politicians) call for a
discussion on how policies should be decided and who should be
represented when they are. In Atlantic Canada, the main problem is one
of representativity; of making sure that those who participate are in fact
speaking on behalf of those they claim to represent. This is largely a
question of better organization.
There are, however, dilemmas here. Broader, non-industrial participa-
tion, for instance, would accommodate demands for a more responsible
and open process, but could well undermine the legitimacy of, say,
management decisions within the industry proper. More powers vested in
user-groups and lower level agencies may increase participation and
legitimacy, but would certainly make decision-making more complex
and time-consuming. Having the industry choose its own representatives
would remove some uncertainty as to who is speaking for whom, but the
process may be both painful and paralyzing.53
Another basic modification which needs to be considered, particularly
in Atlantic Canada, is an alteration in the style of interaction between
52. Although virtually all groups within the fisheries have been able to organize, just
representation does not necessarily follow from this. The Fishermen's Association has long
had privileged access to government, while other organizations, like the Norwegian Associa-
tion of Fish Processors, and the plant workers, do not have the same political clout-and have
just recently been represented in management policy-making.
53. Such changes would complement the possible need to devolve scientific information-
gathering and decision-making. See J. Wilson & P. Kleban, supra note 33.
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politicians, bureaucrats and scientists, on the one hand, and fisherfolk on
the other. It is too frequently the case that politicians, bureaucrats and
scientists look and act like members of Galbraith's "technostructure",
dressing formally, thinking in terms of large organizations, and implicitly
seeking out the input and support of individuals who look and think like
them. In practice, this means that well-educated members of large fishing
organizations acquire significant influence in committee meetings and
lobbying activities because they share important elements of the same
corporate structure. Like it or not, democracy, when it is working well, is
frequently an abrasive, ego-threatening undertaking. Those charged with
management responsibilities might do well to have apprenticeships in the
fishing communities themselves.
5 4
On the Norwegian side, the style of bureaucrats, politicians, and
organizational leaders is more informal and straightforward. The policy
community is small and fairly transparent; communication as much
bottom-up as top-down.5 5 There are, of course, variations in administra-
tive capacity and lobbying strategies, and bureaucrats may, in back-
ground and outlook, have more in common with the big players in the
offshore sector than with the average small scale operator. Whether this
makes any difference to the content of policies and decisions is, however,
far from clear.
Another set of problems arise in the political domain proper. Politi-
cians usually operate with short, inter-election timelines, and frequently
look for quick, uncontroversial solutions to get themselves successfully
through that next election. This typically means that they may be
unwilling to spend the necessary time to develop new plans and directions
or risk the political fallout from new ventures-which is understandable
given the "logic" of democratic politics. In addition, fisheries issues are
normally not prominent on the agenda of most politicians. On this point,
a crisis always helps-as shown by the recent increase in government
intervention and public debate on both sides of the Atlantic.
Further, and with respect to Canada in particular, the cabinet ministers
who are usually selected for the fisheries portfolio at the federal level are,
with some strong exceptions, the least talented members of the cabinet.
Given the relatively low status of the portfolio, ministers also spend a fair
amount of time trying to vacate the post for a more desirable position. The
54. In Atlantic Canada, a considerable number of fisheries scientists can be identified in
mixed audiences by their more casual clothing and demeanor.
55. One official in the Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries in fact told us that it is not altogether
unusual for skippers, while at sea, to call up the ministry on the wireless demanding to speak
to a top level bureaucrat, or even the Minister, to clarify rules and regulations. And officials
will, if they can, oblige as a matter of course.
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turnover, as well as the lack of talent, is exacerbated by the unusually-
concentrated power these individuals have. A job which should com-
mand real ability frequently gets anything but. In Norway, fisheries is a
portfolio that requires knowledge of the industry and the (tacit) approval
of the Fishers's Association. The typical minister will be a person with
some experience from the fisheries-as a bureaucrat, organizational
executive or a fisher--often with a genuine committment to the industry.
With some notable exceptions, few stand out as typical career politicians,
and most will not consider the post a springboard to higher office.
Turnover, then, is no higher than for other portfolios.
Finally, and again perhaps more typical for Atlantic Canada than
Norway, political parties and other interest groups trying to advance the
interests of fisherfolk and their communities frequently make the mistake
of viewing them through ideological lenses which make little accommo-
dation for the peculiarities of the industry. This is particularly true in
Nova Scotia, where various organizing efforts have foundered on a lack
of appreciation of the commitment people have to fishing as an individu-
alistic way of life.56
At the level of culture and communities, there are a number of issues
which are going to require closer attention. If the fisheries are going to
prosper, participants-on both sides of the Atlantic-are going to need
more general education, as well as job-specific training. The relative lack
of general education limits personal flexibility, as well as the ability to
deal effectively with the outside world; the lack of job-specific training
means that people are not capable of producing competitive products, or
the infrastructure needed to compete.57 In order to be attractive to
potential recruits, the status and standing of the fisheries in the national
economy must be strengthened. One way of doing this is to strengthen
education, job training, and the general attractiveness of coastal commu-
nities. On this particular point, Norway is probably well ahead of Atlantic
Canada.
The recent retreat of the state in many industrial systems may force
communities to look inward for resources, both cultural and financial, to
bridge the gap to a more stable future. In Atlantic Canada, the decline of
government resources means that many communities are having their
existence directly threatened; some are meeting the challenge with
56. R. Apostle, L. Kasdan & A. Hanson, "Work Satisfaction and Community Attachment
Among fishers in Southwest Nova Scotia" (1985) 42 Can. J. of Fish. and Aquat. Sci. at 156;
V. Thiessen & A. Davis, "Recruitment to Small Boat Fishing and Public Policy in Atlantic
Canadian Fisheries" (1988) 25 Can. R. Sociol. & Anthrop. 603.
57. D. Patton, Industrial Development and the Atlantic Fishery Opportunities for Manufac-
turing and Skilled Workers in the 1980s (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1981).
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development plans of their own. In Norway, government support has not
declined significantly. During the recent crisis a "coastal package" of
some 126 million Norwegian kroners was put together to assist fishers as
well as processors. In addition, price subsidies and unemployment
insurance were increased.58 There is thus, at present, no indication that
Norwegian coastal communities will be left to fend for themselves.
Concluding Remarks
Crises are helpful in that they bring particular issues to the attention of
government, politicians and the general public. Whether they are equally
instrumental in bringing about change is, of course, another matter.
Attention does not always lead to action, and if it does, it may fail to
address the complexity of the underlying problems. As indicated, the
fisheries crises described above have prompted extensive government
intervention in both countries: a crisis package and smaller quotas in
Norway, economic support and a moratorium in Atlantic Canada. There
has, in other words, been immediate (and sensible) action aimed at
alleviating the short-term problems of fishers and local communities.
In terms of more long-term implications, the crises may prove decisive
in changing the agenda of fisheries management by bringing certain
issues to the forefront. The first concerns the future role of science. With
hindsight it seems clear that scientists, on both sides of the Atlantic, erred
somewhat in their estimates during the 1980s. In Atlantic Canada, the
state of the stocks was obviously overrated and quotas set accordingly.
The subsequent collapse of the northern cod stock in particular, came as
a big shock to most of those affected. In Norway, stock estimates may
have been a little too conservative, and quota cuts too severe, considering
the speed with which the resource recovered. In this sense, both crises are
a dramatic illustration of the shortcomings of current scientific concepts
and procedures. There is, at present, an increasing awareness of how the
complexity of the biological environment generates enormous informa-
tion problems and makes it hard to maintain any pretence of scientific
certainty. Besides, scientists work within a social environment and their
judgements may not be immune to political pressures. Both factors have
already spurred a debate, perhaps long overdue, on the role of numerical
analysis and control in fisheries management.
The second issue concerns the choice of harvesting technology and the
overall structure of the industry. These have always been matters of
dispute, particularly in Norway where inshore fishers and small scale
58. S. Jentoft, supra note 5; 0. Otterstad, in 0. Otterstad & S. Jentoft, eds., supra note 6.
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operators have been able to challenge the bigger players offshore.
Whenever the stocks fail there is always the question of what went wrong
and why. On this point the recent crises have sharpened the conflict
between inshore and offshore, between the people of local communities
and representatives of "big-business"', and breathed new life into the
debate on the future technology and structure of the fishing industry. The
recent crises have also heightened the ecological awareness of public
interest groups, generating pressures, not just for more ecologically
sound harvesting methods, but also for extending the fisheries policy
community beyond those traditionally involved. Demands, on both sides
of the Atlantic, for extended representation on management committees
and councils, indicates that there is a better balance to be struck in
fisheries management between the economic interests of fishers and the
broader environmental concerns of the general public. The crises have, in
other words, generated pressures for changing management institutions
so as to make participation on boards and committees less exclusive and
"corporatist". Demands for broader and more open institutions are not
very controversial and may well be met. What difference this will make
as to the quality of fisheries management and the prospects of avoiding
another major crisis is, however, far from clear.
